THE GERMAN-ITALIAN ALLIANCE AND VICHY FRANCE

THE GERMAN-ITALIAN ALLIANCE AND VICHY FRANCE

Mikhail Derbasov

Senior Lecturer, Russian Biotechnological University

of the Russian Federation,

Russia, Moscow

ГЕРМАНО-ИТАЛЬЯНСКИЙ СОЮЗ И ВИШИСТСКАЯ ФРАНЦИЯ

Дербасов Михаил Васильевич

старший преподаватель, Российский биотехнологический университет,

РФ, г. Москва

Germany's claims to the territory of France began in 1939, which is confirmed by the article "Colonial claims of Germany" published in the newspaper Pravda on February 8, 1939.

In fact, Germany claimed to return to her colonies, which were ceded to European countries, most of them France, under the terms of the Armistice of 11 November 1918, also known as the Armistice of Compiègne. However, according to General Tilo, the French would never agree to return part of the colonies to the Germans, since "there would be a threefold kind of danger: 1) air attack; 2) land attack; 3) threat from the sea. [2]

Thus, it becomes clear that the upcoming new world war was another plan for the redistribution of the world and the return of the lost German colonies.

At the time of the publication of these plans of Germany, France needed to review the armament and strengthening of the territories bordering with Germany, which, unfortunately, was not done.

The reasons why France did not react to this statement by Germany become quite clear in the speech of Foreign Minister Zh. Bonnet, which stated that the Franco-German declaration signed on December 6, 1938 "was to serve as the first stage in the development of prospects for further cooperation between France and Germany."[1] However, in the same speech, Bonnet said that "France will not give up an inch of its land to Italy." [3]

This statement is significant because French politicians were optimistic about relations between the two powers. Even E. Daladier, in his speech at the Senate meeting, noted that France "will not tolerate a policy of retreat." [1]

Even before the outbreak of hostilities on the part of Germany, it was stated that the rebuff would be substantial, but these were just words that did not lead to tangible results.

The hardening of Germany's policy towards France officially began with a public speech by J. Goebbels, in which he stated that "if at first France tried to convince everyone that it opposes Hitlerism, now it openly declares a plan for the complete defeat of Germany." [6, 8]

Naturally, any of the warring powers wants to win, but it is worth objectively assessing the enemy and their capabilities.

It was with the beginning of the main hostilities in early September 1939 between England-France and Germany, which were called in the literature as the Phoney War, that the rapprochement of Germany and Italy in the fight against the French armed forces began. Thus, France found itself in a situation in which it was necessary to open a second front in the south of the country, which led to the separation of troops and the weakening of defense. [4]

On the eve (1940) of signing the terms of the armistice between Germany and France, A. Hitler personally arrived in Compiegne to meet with representatives of the French government. During the meeting, the Fuhrer of the Third Reich highlighted the moments that had a negative impact on the history of Germany, in particular the shameful terms of the armistice dictated by General F. Foch on November 11, 1918.

A. Hitler, like any other leader of the country, dreamed of restoring the violated authority of Germany, therefore, immediately after the opening speech in the armistice agreement, he returned to Berlin, thereby showing that the war did not accidentally end in favor of Germany, and this was exactly the revenge that the whole country was heading for. [5]

The introductory speech spoke about the main three conditions of the German-French agreement:

1. ensuring the impossibility of resuming the struggle;

2. providing Germany with a condition of complete security for the continuation of the war imposed on her against England;

3. The creation of the preconditions necessary for the establishment of a new peace, the essence of which will be to correct the injustice inflicted on Germany by the use of force. [7, 10]

On June 22, 1940, at the Retond station in the Compiegne Forest, in the same carriage in which Marshal F. Foch dictated the terms of the German armistice 22 years ago, German General V. Keitel and French General S. Huntziger signed an armistice agreement.

The signing of this agreement ends the war, which was called «phoney». Unlike 1918, France suffered defeats and fell into the rigid framework of the German occupation. In this regard, it is necessary to consider the terms of the armistice since they determine the position of France after the surrender.

According to the first article of this treaty, all French troops had to surrender to German troops, thereby the German side stipulated the fact of voluntary acceptance of the surrender by France.

Trying to limit the French government, the German side has clearly delineated the zones of influence. The occupied territory included territories lying to the north and west of the line passing through the following points: Geneva, Dole, Chalon (on the Sopa), Paret-le-Monial, Moulin, Bourges, Vierzon, then through a point located 20 kilometers east of Tours, further south, parallel to the railway running from Angouleme to Mont-de-Morsan and Saint Jean-Pierre-de-Port. All of these areas were the most important strategic points, since most of the industrial enterprises and agricultural regions were concentrated in them. [9]

At the same time, Germany showed favor to the defeated side and allowed, under the terms of the armistice, the relocation of the new French government to Paris. When considering this condition, it is worth noting that the winning side is extremely advantageous to have the government of the unoccupied part of the country in the occupied territory, thereby increasing the opportunity to impose its own policy.

Most of the articles of this treaty are aimed at demilitarization of France, in order to avoid resistances on the part of the population of the occupied territories and the population. [13]

Article 18 refers to the maintenance of the occupation army, which becomes an obligation of the French treasury, but a clear amount has not been established. The fact that most of France was occupied by German troops, the maintenance costs of which fell on France, put the latter in direct economic dependence on Germany.

Despite the actual signing of the agreement, it entered into force 6 hours after the conclusion of such an agreement between Italy and France, thereby Germany made every attempt to renounce the terms of the agreement imposed on France.

Contrary to all the declarations of the Germans, the terms of the armistice were not only extremely difficult, but also very humiliating. In fact, they deprived France of national independence and sovereignty altogether. In addition, they were compiled in German, which required additional time for detailed translation and study by the French side. [11]

Having signed an armistice agreement with Germany, the French delegation led by General Sh. Huntziger flew to Rome, where an agreement with Italy was signed on June 24.

The text of the Italian-French armistice consisted of 26 articles. According to the truce, military operations ceased from the moment the agreement was signed. A small area in the south of France (around the city of Menton) was subject to Italian occupation. Separate articles are devoted to the African colonies of France, to which Italy put forward its claims.

According to Article 9, the entire French fleet was disarmed and demobilized, except for those ships that were in the African colonies, since they were designated to maintain order. [15]

Based on Article 20, Italy received the full right to transport goods of any destination from Germany through French territory.

June 25, 1940 was officially declared a Day of National Mourning in connection with the entry into force of the armistice agreements with Germany and Italy.

Germany tried in every possible way to tighten the economic framework for the French state, so all the consequences of the war and the restoration of buildings and communications were also assigned to the losing side, thereby the German government proved its superiority over the French.

Since the signing of the armistice agreement, the struggle for the French fleet began, which was quite well equipped and in good condition, in which it was second only to the British naval forces. For the German command, the primary task was to concentrate the French fleet in their hands, that is, to become a country superior to Great Britain in quality and quantity of military vessels.

According to Article 8 of the German-French Armistice agreement, "the entire French fleet, with the exception of the part that will be left to France to ensure French interests in the colonies, must be assembled in ports that will be designated for this purpose, for demobilization and disarmament under German and Italian control. The German Government solemnly declares that it has no intention of using for its own interests during the war the French fleet, which will be in ports under German control, with the exception of vessels necessary for coastal service and for catching mines. With the exception of that part of the fleet that will be intended to protect colonial interests and the size of which must still be determined, all other ships located outside French territorial waters must be immediately recalled to France." [15]

The terms of the armistice of June 22 and the subsequent armistice of France with Italy of June 24 did not contain any political conditions that could be considered as an element of a future peace treaty. Very skeptical of his Italian ally, and also wanting to use France as a vassal, the Fuhrer did not allow his Italian partner to take part in the occupation of France.

On July 6, 1940, a joint decree was issued by A. Hitler and B. Mussolini, which stated that the above article of the agreement was canceled in order to preserve the fleet that was heading to France and leave it in the ports of the French colonies under the protection of coastal batteries from the British fleet, which the day before damaged the French battleships Dunkirk, Brittany, Provence, destroyer Mogador.

According to the reports, it is clear that the French fleet was located between two warring states – Great Britain and Germany – and, naturally, each of the parties had their own claims to the French naval forces.

Despite the signing of the armistice agreement between France and Italy, the latter was not particularly pleased with its position as a "victorious" country, which received only a small part of the French territory. In this regard, the Italian press began attacking the Petain government, which, according to them, "is no different from the old France. Laval has always been an enemy of Italy and Germany, and France has always hated and will hate Italy."

Subsequent negotiations on the relationship between the states were essentially conducted only between representatives of the German command and the Petain government, although formally the negotiations were trilateral, since the Vichy government officially signed an armistice agreement with both Germany and Italy.

Italy tried in every possible way to express its position in which it was placed by the German government. However, it was not France's fault, but Germany's, since it was not profitable for her to share the industrial areas of France with anyone else, since additional industrial forces were concentrated there, which could be sent to provide German troops. [9, 13]

According to the Fuhrer's plans, it was best to manage the occupied territory according to the ancient principle derived by Philip II of Macedon: "Divide and rule!" This was made clear in his policy of dividing France into separate small regions. The first of these regions was Brittany. The article "Plans for the dismemberment of France" stipulates the separation of Brittany from France and the appointment of a local administration there under the control of Berlin. This is due to the fact that the German government often expressed dissatisfaction with the Vichy government. "Brittany is only a signal and the separation of Provence and Burgundy should be expected."

At the end of August 1940, Laval met with the German "Paris Center" in Paris. During the meeting, issues of restoring normal relations and communications between the occupied zone and the zone under the control of the Vichy Government were discussed, and the question of the Petain government moving to Paris was also raised, which made the latter directly dependent on the occupying forces.

It is important to note that German representatives announced that postal communication between the two zones of France will be restored, provided that the demarcation line is moved to the entire southern border of France. Thus, Germany sought to install German outposts not on the border of the north and south of one country, but along its state borders, thereby effectively occupying the whole of France.

In addition to political pressure from Germany, there was an increase in economic influence, in particular on heavy industry, which remained on the territory of the unoccupied areas of France. According to the decree of the Wehrmacht of October 16, 1940, a ban was imposed in France on the production of "weapons and ammunition intended for land, sea and air warfare, mechanisms and motors that can be used for weapons, gunpowder and explosives, as well as combat gases." All actions of this kind on the part of the German government were not accidental, since the purpose of these decrees was to destroy the already shattered economic system of the country, as well as to suppress possible resistance. [2, 6]

The political subordination of the country became an actual reality for Germany, however, there were some areas in which it was necessary to establish itself by signing contracts on a favorable basis for the German side. Therefore, on January 20, 1941, a meeting of German and French industrialists was held in Clermont-Ferrand. The negotiations were quite successful, as evidenced by the signing of agreements on the distribution of orders from the German side between French enterprises, as well as supplying them with all the necessary raw materials. To provide all the necessary troops, German industrialists placed their orders in all territories that were under the influence of the Wehrmacht.

The influence of the German side on both occupied and unoccupied territories increased with each signed agreement. Gradually, the depletion of the Vichy government's monetary reserves forced Petain to sign conventions with the French Bank, which allocated funds to replenish the French treasury. It is worth noting another agreement between the government and the bank, since according to the German-French armistice agreement, the amount for the maintenance of the occupation forces should consist of 20 million marks, or 400 million francs per day. This amount was enough to cover the costs of maintaining the army until February 1941. The first such convention was signed on August 25, 1940, providing for an advance of 50 billion francs to cover expenses until the end of October 1940. On October 29 of the same year, the second convention was signed, which increased the advance to 65 billion francs, which should have been enough until the first days of December 1940. The third Convention of December 12, 1940 provided for an increase in the amount of the advance by 8 billion francs, which were exhausted in just 20 days. At the end of December 1940 the amount was spent in full, in connection with which the fourth convention was signed between the French Bank and the Vichy government of France. [12, 17]

Taking into account the dependence of the country and the government on the occupiers, the development of Franco-German cooperation relations was considered by many not only as a positive process for France and the French, but there were people who tried to sabotage this cooperation. According to a report by the German information bureau on Franco-German relations, people began to appear in French government circles who sabotaged the cooperation of Vichy and Berlin. Therefore, the German side shifted the development of the relations themselves entirely to the Government of F. Petain, since the political evolution of relations between the two countries depends on the French government. It follows from this that Germany withdrew from participating in discussions in the Petain government, but indicated that if the outcome of the government debate was unsuccessful, the development of Franco-German relations would cease.

Germany's policy in the occupied territory was aimed at directing the economy of the whole of France in favor of the treasury of the Reich. That is why the Paris Center issues a decree on the confiscation of all property belonging to citizens of the British Empire, Egypt, Sudan and Iraq. This event led to the aggravation of relations between England and France and to the search for the protection of France from Britain from Germany. [14, 16]

According to the French government, from the moment Laval came to power, the Petain government began to be treated with a high degree of suspicion and distrust, not hiding it at all, since everyone considered Laval a protege of the Wehrmacht in France.

Realizing that France is gradually falling into not only an economic, but also a food crisis, Germany releases 7 thousand peasants, 10 thousand miners and about 10-15 thousand soldiers from captivity by March 23, who have four or five children, however, according to Article 20 of the armistice agreement, the German side retains all prisoners of war up to conclusion of a peace treaty with all the warring countries: England, Germany, Italy. [19]

According to the statistics of French researchers, the area of France under occupation is 55% of the total territory of France, including colonies. 67% of the French population (approximately 28 million people), i.e. 80% of wage workers, are concentrated in this territory. The occupied zone accounts for 97% of fishing, 74% of wheat production and 70% of potatoes, in addition, approximately 75% of French livestock is located in this zone. These indicators demonstrate that the main sources of food and human resources are concentrated in the hands of the "Paris Center", hence the shortage of food in unoccupied France. In the zone controlled by the Vichy government, only a few wheat fields are concentrated, and all the main industrial enterprises are located in the north of the country. [18]

After Nazi Germany declared war on the Soviet Union, the results of the occupation for the year were summed up. According to Paris newspapers, an agreement was concluded between the German authorities and the Vichy government, according to which 190 thousand heads of cattle, 565 thousand heads of small cattle, 600 thousand pigs and calves, 100 thousand tons of salt, 17 million hectoliters of wine should be delivered from the unoccupied to the occupied zone of France. It follows from this that Germany used not only the reserves of the occupied regions for the war with the USSR, but also the territories and countries under its dependence, in particular France.

In the period from June 22, 1940 to June 22, 1941, in France, both in occupied and unoccupied territories, clear control was established by Berlin and the "Paris Center". It is worth noting that the role of Italy in the occupation of French territory is extremely insignificant. However, despite the fact that Marshal Petain's government existed in the unoccupied zone of France, Germany, through its intermediaries in the Vichy government, in particular Laval, carried out activities aimed at extracting benefits for the war with the British Empire and, later, with the Soviet Union.

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